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This paper presents a two period overlapping generations model with en-
dogenous growth in the presence of a public sector with objectives of conver-
gence for public debt and primary balance to GDP ratios. In order to ensure
the existence of converging paths towards the target values of ¯scal variables,
we introduce a simple ¯scal policy rule. According to this rule, the primary
balance ratio is adjusted in function of the distance between the current and
the target levels of the public debt and the primary surplus to GDP ratios. It
is shown that the ¯scal rule displaying time invariant parameters may pro-
duce non linear dynamic processes of adjustment of the ¯scal ratios as well
as endogenous °uctuations in the rate of growth of the economy. In addi-
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nous Growth.
Keywords:  Fiscal Policy; Sustainability of Public Finances; Endoge-Sustainability of public ¯nances under speci¯c economic conditions and ¯scal
convergence have acquired growing importance in the current policy debate
in the Euro Area. The present paper studies the path of convergence of an
economy towards well-de¯ned ¯scal targets in a simple framework of analysis
with overlapping generations and endogenous growth.
We present a model in which the demand side is characterized by a
two-period overlapping generations scheme µ a la Samuelson (1956) and Di-
amond (1965) with no bequest motive, while the supply side is described
by a technology exhibiting positive externalities from capital accumulation
of the learning-by-doing variety in the spirit of Arrow (1962), Sheshinsky
(1967) and Romer (1986). The presence of positive externalities ensures that
the social return of capital is larger than the private return thus the econ-
omy displays endogenous growth. The government levies taxes on the young
generation, provides transfers to the old generation and issues one-period
interest bearing bonds.
There are two channels through which public accounts a®ect the rate of
growth of the economy. On the one hand there is a social security trans-
fer scheme from the young to the old generation which reduces the level of
savings. On the other hand public debt crowds out physical capital accumu-
lation and negatively a®ects growth. In this simple set up we characterize a
policy reaction rule ensuring convergence for di®erent initial ¯scal positions.
In particular, we study the implications of adopting a ¯scal policy rule ac-
cording to which the primary balance is adjusted in function of the distance
between the current and the target levels of public debt and of primary sur-
plus to GDP ratios. The government has at its disposal two adjustment tools
to implement the rule: the tax rate and the bene¯t rate. Alternatively, with
the aim of ful¯lling the rule and stabilising output growth at its steady state
level, the government may use both instruments in conjunction.
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Non-technical summaryThe simulation exercises show how ¯scal variables a®ect the dynamics
of the rate of growth of the economy along the adjustment process towards
the long-run equilibrium. In particular, the operation of a ¯scal convergence
rule with time invariant parameters may trigger °uctuations in growth rates
around the steady state and spiraling dynamics of the debt to GDP ratio
around its target value. Moreover, it is shown that the alternative use of
the bene¯t rate on pension or of the tax rate as ¯scal policy instruments
implies di®erent patterns of adjustment to the ¯scal targets and a®ects the
velocity of convergence. From our simulations it emerges that the control of
the bene¯t rate as instrument instead of the tax rate has a positive impact on
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Sustainability of public ¯nances and sound ¯scal policies are at the core of
the European Monetary Union (EMU). The Treaty of Maastricht and the
Stability and Growth Pact set up precise objectives of ¯scal convergence for
public sectors of each member country. According to a protocol to the Treaty,
the general government de¯cit to GDP ratio should in fact not exceed 3%
and the public debt to GDP ratio should be lower than 60%. In addition,
the Stability and Growth Pact requires member countries to reach a close
to balance or in surplus position over the medium term. The question of
whether a given level of public debt is sustainable under speci¯c economic
conditions has therefore acquired growing importance in the EMU, where
governments can ¯nance current de¯cits with higher taxes and/or lower pub-
lic expenditures, without any recourse to seigniorage.
The present paper illustrates the dynamics of debt and primary balance
ratios under the hypothesis that the public sector presents well-de¯ned ob-
jectives of convergence in a simple model of analysis with overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) and endogenous growth. The main aim of the study is to fully
characterize a ¯scal policy rule ensuring stability for di®erent initial ¯scal
positions. Moreover, the analytical framework used in this paper allows us
to analyze the interaction of public debt dynamics and the rate of growth of
the economy.
The economy is assumed to be populated by three types of agents: con-
sumers, ¯rms and the government. The demand side of the model is described
by a standard two-period overlapping generations model µ a la Samuelson
(1956) and Diamond (1965), with no intergenerational altruism. Individuals
consume in both periods, but work only when they are young. Savings of the
young generation can be held in the form of physical capital and government
interest bearing bonds. The supply side of the economy is characterized by a
7
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learning-by-doing variety. It follows that the production of each ¯rm is an
increasing function of the average capital-labor ratio prevailing in the econ-
omy. Because of the positive externality the social return of capital is larger
than the private return, and the economy displays endogenous growth of the
type developed by Arrow (1962), Sheshinsky (1967) and Romer (1986).
The public sector is characterized by the existence of a positive stock of
debt and by objectives of ¯scal convergence. The government taxes the young
generation, provides transfers to the old generation and issues one-period
interest bearing bonds. This implies that the model takes into account two
factors negatively a®ecting growth: a stock of public debt, which subtracts
resources from physical capital accumulation (crowding out e®ect), and a
social security system which transfers resources from the young to the old
generations. Therefore, as it is well known in the literature since Saint-Paul
(1992), production externalities and constant social marginal productivity of
capital determine an equilibrium rate of growth which is lower than it would
be in the absence of public debt and of an unfunded social security scheme.
In the set up outlined above, we aim at exploring the implications of a
simple ¯scal rule performing some simulation exercises for alternative combi-
nations of the parameters of the rule and for di®erent initial ¯scal positions.
We consider a policy reaction rule according to which the primary balance
is adjusted in function of the distance between the current and the target
levels of public debt and of primary surplus to GDP ratios, as proposed by
Marµ ³n (2002). The government can use two ¯scal instruments to implement
the rule: the tax rate and the bene¯t rate.
This analysis provides interesting insights into the linkages between ¯scal
variables (i.e. debt and primary surplus ratios) and the dynamics of the rate
of growth of the economy, along the adjustment process towards the steady
state. Moreover the simulation exercise allows us to explore di®erent path of
8
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to the parameters characterising the ¯scal policy rule governing the public
sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the present paper
to the economic literature, while Section 3 introduces the basic model and
describes the market equilibrium conditions. In Section 4 we derive the dy-
namic equation regulating the rate of growth of the economy and introduce
the ¯scal policy rule used by the government in order to reach its objectives.
In particular, we outline the equilibrium conditions of the model under al-
ternative ¯scal tools of adjustment. Section 5 is devoted to the calibration of
parameters and Section 6 to perform some simulation exercises. Speci¯cally,
we derive the parameter space compatible with the sustainability of public
¯nances, describe the path of adjustment of the debt and primary surplus to-
wards the targets and illustrate the dynamics of all the other macro-variables
of interest. Section 7 concludes summarising the main results of the paper.
2 Related Literature
This paper adopts a two-period overlapping generation model, where the
young generation pays income taxes and the government provides transfers
to the old generation (unfunded pension system). The model is characterised
by endogenous growth and explicitly takes into consideration sustainability
issues and ¯scal convergence. This simple framework allows us to analyze the
path of convergence of an economy towards ¯scal targets and to characterise
the in°uences of the public sector on the rate of growth of the economy via the
e®ects on saving and investment decisions. In detail, there are two channels
through which public accounts a®ect the rate of growth of the economy.
First, the distorting e®ects of the social security transfer scheme from the
young to the old generations, which reduces the level of savings, and second,
the crowding out e®ect of public debt on physical capital accumulation.
9
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brie°y discussed in this Section in turn. The e®ects produced by the gov-
ernment debt on growth and welfare is one of the most frequently discussed
subject in the economic literature. The `burden of the debt' issue and the fall
of capital stock arising from the increase in the government debt (crowding
out e®ect) are plainly illustrated by Domar (1944), Malinvaud (1953) and
Modigliani (1961).
Overlapping generations models, in which the breakdown of the Ricardian
equivalence makes the government debt net wealth for households, are the
most appropriate tools of analysis to explore the in°uence of public debt
on the economy. Diamond (1965) analyzes the e®ects of a positive stock of
debt on the long-run competitive equilibrium of an economy with neoclassical
technology. He shows that government debt causes a decline in the utility
level when the equilibrium is dynamically e±cient, but may increase the
utility when the economy is dynamically ine±cient. Ihori (1978) studies the
e®ects of government debt on the long-run optimal conditions and analyzes
the growth paths corresponding to alternative government policies in a life-
cycle economy.
In addition to the literature summarised above, there are several recent
contributions in which the analysis of ¯scal sustainability is shifted away
from a present budget balance perspective and is instead conducted into
a life-cycle model. Chalk (2000) analyzes the sustainability of permanent
bond-¯nanced de¯cits and shows the conditions under which a growth rate
larger than the interest rate is a necessary but not a su±cient condition to
ensure the sustainability of a permanent budget de¯cit. De la Croix and
Michel (2002) investigate the e®ects of the introduction of public debt on
the dynamic properties of a two-period overlapping generations model and
derive the conditions for ensuring sustainability. Mar¶ ³n (2002) studies how a
10
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lic ¯nances and provide automatic stabilization in a small open economy.
Rankin and Ro±a (2003) investigate the structural determinants of a maxi-
mum sustainable public debt and the conditions for its existence under non-
degenerate values of the other economic variables in a Diamond two-period
overlapping generations model. Fernandez-Huertas Moraga and Vidal (2004)
study ¯scal sustainability in a two-period overlapping generations economy
with endogenous growth coming from human capital formation through ed-
ucational spending and parental education.
The engine of growth considered in the present paper is based on capital
externalities in the spirit of Arrow (1962), Sheshinsky (1967) and Romer
(1986), as developed by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). The basic idea is
that the accumulation of capital at aggregate level is an index of knowledge
and positively a®ects production at ¯rm level. In his seminal contribution
Arrow (1962) argues that the learning process is related to the acquisition of
experience, which can be measured by the cumulative level of investments.
In his words \each new machine produced and put into use is capable of
changing the environment in which production takes place, so that learning
is taking place with continually new stimuli" (p. 157).
The e®ects of an unfunded social security or of an increase in public
debt have been studied in many contributions presenting endogenous growth
settings with externalities from physical capital. Saint-Paul (1992) shows
that an unfunded social security scheme or an increase in the level of public
debt cannot be Pareto-improving in an overlapping generations model with
endogenous growth1. However, his analysis is restricted to balanced growth
path and does not address the issue of sustainability of public ¯nances and
1In two-period OLG model with endogenous growth model, Marchand et al. (1995)
show that ascending intergenerational transfers can be welfare-improving when the popu-
lation rate of growth falls unexpectedly.
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a®ects the accumulation of physical capital in an overlapping generations
model displaying production externalities. They show that in the presence
of a positive initial value of the public debt the economy can converge to
a low-level development trap. In particular, in their framework of analysis
public debt is an asset with no intrinsic value and represents a liability of
the government, which is assumed to have a zero expenditure and to levy no
taxes. In other words, public debt is regarded as a pure bubble as in Tirole
(1985).
3 The Model
The model of analysis is a two-period overlapping generations model µ a la
Samuelson (1956) - Diamond (1965) extended to include a social security
system. The supply side is described by a simple endogenous growth model
with a positive externality generated by a learning by doing process in the
production activity. The public sector presents objectives of convergence for
public debt and primary balance. Individuals can hold their wealth in form
of physical capital and of interest bearing public debt bonds2.
3.1 Firms
The production side of the economy is described by a variant of the `learning
by doing' model of the type developed by Arrow (1962), Sheshinsky (1967)
and Romer (1986) as in Grossman and Yanagawa (1992). Assume that there
is a continuum of identical ¯rms that employ labor force and physical capital
in the production process. For simplicity the number of ¯rms is normalized
2The model employed in this paper extends the set up originally presented in Marini
and Scaramozzino (2000, 2003) to account for public debt and primary balance dynamics.
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Yit = F(Kit;Eit); (1)
where Kit is the individual ¯rm i level of capital at the beginning of period t,
Eit is an e±ciency variable de¯ned as Eit = Kt
LtLit and F(¢) is an increasing
function in both the two arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale.
The rationale for a production function as equation (1) is that the production
process generates positive externalities. The e±ciency variable is in fact an
increasing function of the average capital intensity of the economy. The
production function can be written in e±ciency units as
Yit = F(Kit;Eit) = Eitf(kit); (2)
where f(¢) is a strictly concave function and kit =
Kit
Eit.
Under perfect competition the following optimality conditions must hold
for each ¯rm i
rt = f
0(kit); (3)
b wt = f(kit) ¡ kitf
0(kit); (4)
where rt is the real interest rate and b wt is the wage per e±ciency units of





The aggregate production function is de¯ned by summing up the production
functions of all ¯rms. Under the assumption that ¯rms are identical Lit = Lt,
Kit = Kt and kit = 1 for each ¯rm i. It follows that in a symmetrical
equilibrium total output is
Yt = AKt; (6)
where A ´ f(1) > 0: Clearly, at the aggregate level output is linear in
capital and the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. The
13
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incorporates the positive spillovers of capital accumulation, conversely r can
be interpreted as the private marginal product of capital. In the symmetrical
equilibrium factor prices are
rt = f
0(1) = r; (7)




where we assume that A > r, that is that the social return of capital is larger
than the real interest rate.
By combining the factor price equations (7) and (8) with the production
function (6) we obtain
Yt = AKt = rKt + Ltwt; (9)
which simply states that in the competitive equilibrium output is fully ex-
hausted by factor payments.
3.2 Consumers
The demand side is described by a two period overlapping generations model.
Total population is assumed to grow at a constant rate n. Agents work
and earn wage income while young and consume in both periods. Labor is
inelastically supplied by young agents, thus labor force also grows at rate
n. By assumption, there is no bequest motive, young agents are all born
without assets and a social security pension scheme is operative.














where ½ is the rate of time preference, cY
t denotes consumption at time t
and co
t+1 is consumption at time t + 1. We assume that preferences are
14
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while old consumers receive a transfer P. The representative agent born
at time t chooses cY
t and co
t+1 to maximize (10) subject to the °ow budget
constraint in the ¯rst and in the second period, respectively given by:
c
Y





t+1 = (1 + r)¾
Y
t + Pt+1; (12)
where ¾Y


























Taxes and bene¯ts are assumed to be proportional to the wage level
Tt = ¿twt; (15)
Pt+1 = ¼t+1wt; (16)
where 0 < ¿t < 1 is the tax rate and ¼t+1 > 0 is the bene¯t rate. It follows













Finally, young consumers are assumed to accumulate their wealth in form of
capital Kt and of interest bearing-bonds Bt issued by the public sector. The
condition of no-arbitrage between the two assets guarantees that their rate
of return is the same.
3Logarithmic preferences imply that saving decisions do not depend on the interest
rate in the absence of any transfer scheme. In this framework, however, since the interest
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The public sector is described by an in¯nite lived government whose °ow
budget constraint is
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Bt ¡ St; (18)
where St is the primary budget surplus and is de¯ned as the di®erence be-
tween the total amount of contributions paid by young consumers and the
total amount of bene¯ts paid to the old generation
St = LtTt ¡ Lt¡1Pt: (19)
The ¯scal policy regime is characterized by the sequences fBt; Stg1
t=0 and
only one of these sequences can be chosen independently, since one is implied
by the other4. Recalling that taxes and pension bene¯ts are set according to
(15) and (16), the government has two instruments to control the dynamics
of the primary surplus and, therefore, the public debt: the tax rate, ¿, and
the bene¯t rate, ¼:
3.4 Market equilibrium
The resource constraint for the economy describing the capital accumulation
process can be expressed as
Yt ¡ Ct = Kt+1 ¡ Kt; (20)
where Ct is total consumption at time t de¯ned as the sum of consumption






which can be re-written as
Ct = Lt(wt ¡ ¾
Y
t ¡ Tt) + (1 + r)(Bt + Kt) + Lt¡1Pt: (22)
4In the following Section we will characterise the ¯scal regime.
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debt bonds. Their aggregate level of consumption is then equal to the total
amount of bene¯ts plus the whole wealth and the interest payments that
they receive from the ¯rms and the government.
Recalling that total income is given by (9), equation (22) becomes
Ct = Yt ¡ Lt(¾
Y
t + Tt) + (1 + r)Bt + Kt + Lt¡1Pt; (23)
that combined with the government budget constraint (18) yields
Ct = Yt ¡ Lt¾
Y
t + Bt+1 + Kt: (24)
Combining this result with resource constraint of the economy (20) we
obtain the following equilibrium condition linking the current level of saving
to the next period stock of wealth
Bt+1 + Kt+1 = Lt¾
Y
t : (25)
This condition simply states that savings of period t become wealth in period
t+1 and guarantees the equilibrium on capital market. Recalling the saving
function (17), condition (25) becomes










In the absence of any bequest motive the old generation want to end
up with no wealth when they pass away. It follows that all the stock of
wealth owned by the old is purchased by the young with their savings. From
the above equilibrium condition is clear that a positive stock of public debt
crowds out physical capital5.
5It should be noted that the resource transfer from the young generation to the gov-
ernment in the form of taxes and purchase of government bond, Bt+1 + LtTt; is equal
to the resource transfer from the government to the old generation, consisting of debt
services and transfers, (1 + r)Bt + Lt¡1Pt: This property of the model is at the basis of
17
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nomic Growth
The whole economy can be described by equations (19), (18) and (26) which




















¡ A[(1 + r)bt ¡ st]; (29)
where Gt+1 =
Yt+1
Yt is the growth factor; bt = Bt
Yt and st = St
Yt are the public
debt and the primary surplus to GDP ratios, respectively.
To close the model we consider a general policy reaction function of the
type proposed by Mar¶ ³n (2002). The behavior of the primary balance surplus
ratio st is described by the following equation
st = st¡1 + u(bt ¡ b
¤) ¡ v(st¡1 ¡ s
¤); (30)
the so-called `equivalence result' illustrated by Buiter and Kletzer (1992a, 1992b), which




always be generated by an appropriate sequence for taxes and transfers fTt;Ptg1
t=0 for
any given sequence for debt fBtg1
t=0. In other words, any sequence of variables can be
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primary surplus, respectively6. The ¯scal rule represented in (30) implies
two convergence parameters, u and v. Henceforth, we will denote this rule
as the `u ¡ v rule'.
The economy displays di®erent dynamics, depending on the use of the tax
rate ¿ or of the bene¯t rate ¼ as ¯scal adjustment instrument to control the
primary surplus and implement the `u ¡ v rule'. The government may use,
in fact, one of the two instruments, keeping the other one as ¯xed in order to
reach its ¯scal targets. Alternatively, the government may elect to combine
the two instruments in order to pursue ¯scal convergence and stabilize the
rate of growth of the economy at the same time.
4.1 Tax rate as ¯scal instrument
Consider the case in which the tax rate is the endogenously determined to
implement the `u¡v rule', while the bene¯t rate is kept constant, ¼t+1 = ¼t =
¼. In this case the dynamic equation describing the time path of the growth

















st ¡ (1 + r)bt
¸
A: (31)
Equation (31) is a nonlinear di®erence equation in Gt. For every value of
Gt and the initial level of bt, the above equation determines the equilibrium
value of Gt+1 corresponding to the level of the primary surplus st
7.
6For a given level of the long run growth factor G, only one of the ¯scal targets can be
identi¯ed independently, since one is determined by the other. In what follows we set the
¯scal targets in terms of b¤, determining s¤ accordingly.
7It should be noted that in the absence of public debt and of a pension system, the
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a set of sequences fGt+1;bt+1;st;¿tg1
t=0, satisfying (27), (28), (30) and (31),
given the initial conditions fG0;b0;s¡1g. It should be noted that the equa-
tions describing the economy are recursive, thus given the initial conditions
one can determine the sequences fGt+1;bt+1;stg1
t=0 for each combination of
the parameters (u;v).
4.2 Bene¯t rate as ¯scal instrument
In this section, we turn to the case in which the bene¯t rate is used as
adjustment tool to ful¯ll the `u¡v rule', while the tax rate is kept constant,
¿t = ¿. Moving (27) one period ahead and combining the result with (29)
give the equation governing the growth factor
Gt+1 =
A¡r





1+r [(A ¡ r)¿ ¡ Ast+1]
: (32)
In this case the macroeconomic equilibrium is described by the set of se-
quences fGt+1;bt+1;st;¼tg1
t=0, satisfying (27), (28), (30) and (32), given the
initial conditions fG0;b0;s¡1g.
4.3 A mixed approach
Consider the case in which the government controls both the tax and the
bene¯t rate in order to implement the `u ¡ v rule' and keeps the output

















which describes the time path of the growth factor as function of the two
¯scal instruments ¼t and ¿t:
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f¿t;¼t+1g1
t=0 in order stabilise growth Gt+1 = Gt = G in (33) and to satisfy
























where the primary surplus dynamics is governed by the `u ¡ v rule'. The
macroeconomic equilibrium can be then de¯ned as set of sequences f¿t;¼t+1;bt+1;stg1
t=0,
satisfying (28), (30), (34) and (35), given the initial conditions f¼0;b0;s¡1g8.
5 Calibration
In order to calibrate the model and perform some simulation exercises, we
interpret each period as being composed by 30 years9. This means that
according to the equilibrium condition (26) the old generation owns the total
stock of capital and of public debt acquired with the °ow of savings generated
in a period of 30 years. In other words, savings become productive only after
30 years. This is an unfortunate feature of the two period OLG model.
The time structure of the model also implies that the various rates should
be interpreted as 30 years based. In order to analyze the dynamics and
the adjustment path of the economy towards the ¯scal policy objectives, we
calibrate the model as follows.
The real interest rate r is set equal to 3% per annum; consumers are
assumed to be relatively patient and the annual rate of time preference ½ is
set equal to 1%. We set the steady state rate of growth of the economy to
8Note that for simplicity we have assumed that the government takes as given the
bene¯t rate paid to the old generation at time t.
9This choice is standard in the literature calibrating two-period models. See for example
Feldestein (1985), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and De la Croix and Michel (2002).
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level of the public debt is equal to 60% of a year's GDP, that is that is equal
to 2% of the GDP produced in 30 years10. The long-run bene¯t rate ¼ is
set equal to 0:50, while the implied tax rate ¿ is equal to 0:24, which in the
absence of public expenditure could be considered a rough approximation of
the young agents average tax burden. Finally, the implied value for the social
return of capital A is 10% on an annual basis. Table 1 reports the underlying
parameter values, the target ¯scal ratios and the long-run growth factor of
the economy. It should be noted that the calibration is only for illustrative
purposes and is not meant to fully re°ect reality.
6 Dynamics of Public Debt and Primary Bal-
ance Ratios
In this Section we study the dynamics of the public debt and of the primary
balance ratios under three alternative adjustment options to implement the
`u ¡ v rule', as outlined in the previous Section. The analysis will proceed
as follows. We ¯rst identify the combinations of policy reaction parameters
(u;v) which ensure convergence of the public debt and of the primary bal-
ance towards the government targets. Then we simulate the model taking
into account di®erent combinations of the parameters which guarantee ¯scal
solvency, given di®erent initial levels of the debt to GDP ratio. In the sim-
ulations, we take the initial conditions fG0;b0;s¡1g as given and we assume
that the `u ¡ v rule' becomes operative at time t = 1. For simplicity, we
hypothesize that the growth factor is initially at its long-run level, G0 = G
10This is another unfortunate feature of this theoretical scheme. However, the old
generation owns the entire stock of wealth through the savings of 30 years. We cannot
imagine that they are able to purchase the entire stock of existing wealth with the savings
of only one year.
and the primary balance surplus is equal to zero, s¡1 = 0:
22
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Consider the case in which the government uses the tax rate ¿ as instrument
to control the dynamics of the primary surplus, while the bene¯t rate is con-
stant over time, ¼t = ¼. In order to characterize the `u¡v rule', we simulate
the model with the aim of describing the combinations of the parameters u
and v which ensure ¯scal convergence under these circumstances. The result
is presented in Figure 1. The shadow area represents the combinations of u
and v which guarantee ¯scal convergence, while any other combinations of
those parameters determine an explosive path for the debt11. All parame-
ter combinations which lead the economy to the ¯scal targets, but produce
negative values for the debt ratios at early stages, are not considered in the
¯scal convergence space. In other words, we run simulations under the re-
striction b ¸ 0 during the adjustment process. This assumption allows us
to rule out too aggressive reaction rules and to de¯ne a ¯nite convergence
parameter space. In details, the parameter governing the adjustment of the
primary de¯cit towards its targets v should be greater than 0.4 but less than
1.4 at maximum. On the other hand the parameter regulating the speed of
adjustment of public debt u towards its target should be greater than one.
The darker area indicates the subset of parameter combinations which rule
out the possibility of overshooting the target of the public debt to GDP ratio
during the convergence process. From Figure 1 it also emerges that a larger
sensitivity of the rule to debt deviations is not su±cient by itself for ¯scal
convergence when v < 0:4: It can be shown that in such circumstances ¯scal
11In the numerical simulation a set of parameter values lead to ¯scal convergence if
after 200 periods the public debt to GDP ratio is in a small neighborhood of its target,
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trajectories converge to an attractor and the economy is characterized by
everlasting °uctuations12.
Once the parameter space guaranteeing convergence has been determined,
we perform some simulations aiming at discovering the path of debt adjust-
ment towards the government targets (60% of GDP) from di®erent initial
positions. Moreover, it is our intention to show the resulting time paths for
the ¯scal instrument (tax rate) and the e®ects on growth. Then we replicate
the simulation, ¯xing the u parameter at 2.5 and moving the level of the
parameter v from 1 to 0.5.
Figures 2-4 report the results of the simulation (u=2.5 and v=1). Figure 2
shows the dynamics of the ¯scal ratios for di®erent starting levels of the public
debt ratio13. For example, starting from a 110% debt ratio it is required a
primary surplus ratio of about 4.8% to take the debt ratio to 67% in the
¯rst period. Since the policy has been aggressive in the second period the
mechanical implementation of the rule requires a fall in the surplus ratio.
The adjustment process ceases when the debt ratio reaches its target level.
From Figure 3 we observe that in order to reach the target level of a debt
ratio of 60% the tax rate should be increased by a large size (the greater the
initial debt position the higher the increase in the tax rate). This increase
guarantees su±cient primary surpluses for determining a reduction in the
debt to GDP ratio. At a certain point in time the tax rate can be decreased
determining a reduction of the primary surplus, but without prejudice to
the adjustment process. As for growth, the ¯scal policy tightening implies a
12Endogenous cycles frequently arise in two period overlapping generations schemes.
For example De la Croix and Michel (2002) show that everlasting °uctuations may emerge
when the government maintains the de¯cit constant.
13Despite the simulations have been carried out on 30-year basis, for illustrative purposes
we have re-scaled the debt ratios and the growth factor in annual basis in Figures 2-3, 5-6,
9-10, 12-13, 16-17 and 19-20.
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August 2004reduction in the economic activity in the ¯rst period and a recovery thereafter
(see Figure 2).
In the following simulation we calibrate the ¯scal policy rule with the
same value for u; but with a reduced value for v (0.5). Figures 5-7 shows
that, the results do not change in the ¯rst period. However the impact of the
tax changes and the operation of the ¯scal policy rule determine °uctuations
in the growth factor such that the level of debt targeted by the government
is overshooted. The graphs show long-lasting dynamics around the target
level mainly driven by growth °uctuations around the steady state.
In detail, consider Figure 5. Starting from a 110% debt ratio the rule
requires a primary surplus ratio of about 4.5% to take the debt ratio to 72%
in the ¯rst period. In the following two periods the debt ratio overshoots
its target level, requiring a reduction in the surplus ratio. The reduced level
of surplus determines an increase in the debt ratio in the ¯fth period. The
process continues until the debt ratio reaches its target level. Clearly, the
mechanical application of the `u¡v rule' may cause cyclical dynamics of the
public debt and of the primary balance ratios and be source of endogenous
°uctuations of the rate of growth of the economy.
Table 2 reports the number of periods necessary to reduce the public debt
to GDP ratio to 60% for di®erent starting levels for the debt ratio and various
combinations of the ¯scal parameters, u and v: The rule seems to perform
relatively better for intermediate values of u and large levels of v. This ex-
ercise shows that the relationships among the parameters of the ¯scal rule
and the length of the convergence period are not straightforward. In partic-
ular, it results the absence of any monotonic relationships between the rule
parameter u and the speed of adjustment, while a larger reaction to surplus
deviations reduces the number of periods necessary for ¯scal convergence,
as expected. The rationale behind this result can be explained as follows.
From the analysis it emerges that the trajectories are not linear and that the
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August 2004public debt ratio overshoots its long run level several times before converging
to it. In correspondence of larger values of the parameter u the amplitude of
these oscillations tend to be wider, delaying ¯scal convergence. This e®ect
can be partially counterbalanced by larger values of v: Not surprisingly, the
higher the initial debt ratio, the longer the period necessary to reach the
target ratio.
6.2 Bene¯t rate as ¯scal instrument
When the adjustment instrument used by the ¯scal authorities is the bene¯t
rate and the tax rate is invariant, the families of parameters (u;v) that
guarantee ¯scal convergence are represented by the shadow area in Figure
8. It clearly emerges that in this case ¯scal convergence is also possible
for lower level of the parameters. In particular, the parameter governing
the adjustment of the primary balance v from its target should be smaller
than 1.7, but greater than 0.3 in correspondence of low levels of the ¯scal
parameter u14. Conversely, for larger level of the velocity of reaction of the
primary balance to the divergence of the debt ratio from its target, u, the
parameter v can be lower. The darker area represents the combinations of
policy parameters ensuring a non-increasing path for the debt ratio. As
observed in the previous case, for low values of u and large of v it is possible
to reach the ¯scal targets without overshooting the targeted debt ratio.
Figures 9-11 display the simulation results for u=2.5 and v=1. Figure 9
shows the paths of the debt and of the primary surplus ratios. As expected
the debt ratio follows a decreasing path toward its long-run value. Figure 10
shows that the implementation of the rule determines a temporary, though
negligible, increase in the growth factor on impact, while according to Figure
11 the bene¯t rate is initially reduced. The improved economic conditions
14As seen in the tax rate regime in correspondance of low values of v the economy my
encounter everlasting °uctuations around the steady state.
26
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 381
August 2004reduce the critical ¯scal ratios, it follows that in the following period the
mechanical application of the ¯scal rule requires an increase in the bene¯t
rate, which determines an increase in the growth factor.
Figures 12-14 show the simulation results for u=2.5 and v=0.5. Figure 12
represents the dynamics of the debt and of the primary surplus ratios showing
the alternative paths of convergence starting from di®erent initial debt ratios.
Again we observe endogenous °uctuations around the ¯scal targets. Figure
14 shows that the bene¯t rate is initially reduced, determining an increase
in the growth factor (see Figure 13). During the process of adjustment the
endogenous °uctuations become smaller and the economy converges to its
long-run equilibrium.
Table 3 reports the number of periods necessary to take the public debt to
GDP ratio to 60% for di®erent initial conditions for the debt ratio and alter-
native combinations of the parameters, u and v: As observed for the tax rate
regime case, the larger v the shorter the convergence period. Conversely, the
observed non-linearities would again explain the absence of any monotonic
relationships between the parameter u and the ¯scal convergence period. In
such circumstances, however the rule implies a shorter convergence period for
large values of v and intermediate levels of u; independently of the starting
level of the public debt to GDP ratios. In general, when the bene¯t rate
is used as ¯scal instrument, it takes less time to reach the 60% target ratio
than when the tax rate is endogenously set.
6.3 A mixed approach
We now analyze the ¯scal regime under which the policies authorities are
assumed to set the tax and the bene¯t rate in order to implement the `u¡v
rule' and keep the rate of growth constant at its long-run level, G. Figure
15 illustrates the region of the parameter space associated with ¯scal conver-
gence. The region of convergence expands, relatively to the previous cases.
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August 2004For values of u close to zero and for low levels of v in fact much of the pic-
tured space is associated with ¯scal convergence. The dark area, referring to
the parameter combinations ensuring a never increasing convergence path is
also larger than in the previous cases.
Figures 16-18 represent the dynamics of the economy for u=2.5 and v=1.
Clearly, the bene¯t ratio must initially fall, while the tax rate must increase
so as to respect the rule and to keep the growth factor as ¯xed.
Figure 19 shows that dynamics of the ¯scal ratios along the adjustment
path towards their long-run levels. We notice once again endogenous °uctu-
ations in the critical ¯scal ratios all along the convergence process towards
the steady state. In this case the observed °uctuations are determined by the
combined use of the two ¯scal instruments which are continuously adjusted
such that the ¯scal rule is ful¯lled and the growth factor of the economy is
maintained at its long-run level (see Figures 20 and 21).
Finally, Table 4 reports the number of periods necessary for the economy
to reach the ¯scal targets and shows that the combined use of both instru-
ments tends to perform relatively better for large levels of the parameter v
combined with an intermediate u. Comparing Table 4 with Table 3 we ob-
serve that under the mixed approach the economy converges slightly quickly
for various combinations of the parameters.
7 Conclusion
In order to evaluate the performance of a simple ¯scal policy rule in terms
of its capability of guaranteeing convergence and sustainability of public ¯-
nances, we derived a simple two-period overlapping generation model in an
endogenous growth framework. The policy reaction rule considered in the
paper linked the primary balance ratio to the distance between the current
and the target levels of public debt and of primary surplus to GDP ratios.
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August 2004With the objective of satisfying the rule, the government has two ¯scal instru-
ments available: either the tax rate or the bene¯t rate. Furthermore, with
the aim of stabilising output growth at its steady state level, the government
can choose to use the two instruments in conjunction.
This analysis provided interesting insights into the linkages between ¯scal
variables (i.e. debt and primary de¯cit ratios) and the dynamics of the
rate of growth of the economy, along the adjustment process towards the
steady state. The simulation exercise allowed us to explore di®erent path of
adjustments depending on initial conditions and numerical values assigned
to the parameters characterising the ¯scal policy rule governing the public
sector.
The paper showed that ¯scal policy decisions may eventually determine
°uctuations in growth rates around the steady state and converging cycles
of the debt to GDP ratios around target values. It emerged that the im-
plementation of a ¯scal rule characterised by time invariant parameters may
trigger a non linear process of adjustment towards the objective of conver-
gence. In particular, the larger the initial public debt GDP ratio, the larger
the °uctuations in the rate of growth that the economy will experience.
The velocity of ¯scal convergence of economies pursuing the same tar-
gets and implementing the same primary balance rule is showed to depend
on the adjustment tools used by the ¯scal authorities. Reducing the bene¯t
rate instead of increasing the tax rate has a bene¯cial impact on growth and
therefore on the speed of adjustment of the public debt towards its target.
Noticeably, if the government aims at stabilising output growth while ful¯ll-
ing the ¯scal rule requirements for convergence, it should use both available
tools at the same time.
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August 2004Table 1-Calibration
30 Years Annual
Rate of time preferences ½ 0:35 0:01
Interest rate r 1:43 0:03
Bene¯t rate ¼ 0:5 0:5
Tax Rate ¿ 0:24 0:24
Public debt-GDP b¤ 0:02 0:6
Primary balance-GDP s¤ 0:006 0:006
Long-run growth factor G 2:10 1:025
Social return of capital A 14:82 0:10
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Table 2-Number of Periods to Take the Public Debt-GDP Ratio to 60%
(Tax Rate as Fiscal Instrument)
u = 2:5 u = 3 u = 3:5
v 0.5 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 1
b0 = 1:1 23 7 17 25 7 9 26 8 7
b0 = 1 23 7 15 22 7 8 24 6 7
b0 = 0:9 23 6 13 22 7 7 22 6 7
b0 = 0:8 20 6 11 20 5 5 20 6 7
b0 = 0:7 18 6 8 18 5 3 18 4 5
Tablesandfigures33
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Table 4-Number of Periods to Take the Public Debt-GDP Ratio to 60%
(Mixed Approach)
u = 2:5 u = 3 u = 3:5
v 0.5 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 1
b0 = 1:1 18 7 2 18 7 4 19 7 8
b0 = 1 18 7 2 18 7 4 17 7 8
b0 = 0:9 16 6 2 16 6 4 17 7 7
b0 = 0:8 16 6 2 14 6 4 15 6 7
b0 = 0:7 11 5 2 12 5 3 13 4 6
Table 3-Number of Periods to Take the Public Debt-GDP Ratio to 60%
(Bene¯t Rate as Fiscal Instrument)
u = 2:5 u = 3 u = 3:5
v 0.5 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 1
b0 = 1:1 20 7 2 20 8 5 20 7 8
b0 = 1 20 7 2 20 7 4 20 7 8
b0 = 0:9 18 7 2 18 6 4 18 7 8
b0 = 0:8 18 6 2 16 6 4 16 6 7
b0 = 0:7 13 5 2 14 5 3 13 4 6Figure 1: Tax Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 4: Tax Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 6: Tax Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 8: Bene¯t Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 10: Bene¯t Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 12: Bene¯t Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 14: Bene¯t Rate as Fiscal Instrument
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Figure 16: Mixed Approach
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Figure 18: Mixed Approach
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Figure 20: Mixed Approach
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Working Paper Series No. 381
August 2004
354 “Taking stock: monetary policy transmission to equity markets” by M. Ehrmann 
355 “Production interdependence and welfare” by K. X. D. Huang and Z. Liu, May 2004.
356 “Developing a euro area accounting matrix: issues and applications” by T. Jellema, S. Keuning,
P. McAdam and R. Mink, May 2004.
357 “Seasonal adjustment and the detection of business cycle phases” by A. M. Mir and
D. R. Osborn, May 2004.
358 “Did the pattern of aggregate employment growth change in the euro area in the
late 1990s?” by G. Mourre, May 2004.
359 “The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB” by T. Linzert, D. Nautz and U. Bindseil,
May 2004.
360 “Optimal monetary policy rules for the euro area: an analysis using the area wide model”
by A. Dieppe, K. Küster and P. McAdam, May 2004.
361 “Excess reserves and the implementation of monetary policy of the ECB” by U. Bindseil,
G. Camba-Mendez, A. Hirsch and B. Weller, May 2004.
362 “Oil price shocks and real GDP growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries” by
R. Jiménez-Rodríguez and M. Sánchez, May 2004.
363 “Communication and exchange rate policy” by M. Fratzscher, May 2004.
364 “Asset price booms and monetary policy” by C. Detken and F. Smets, May 2004.
365 “Exchange rates and fundamentals: new evidence from real-time data” by M. Ehrmann and
M. Fratzscher, May 2004.
366 “The informational content of over-the-counter currency options” by P. Christoffersen and
S. Mazzotta, June 2004.
367 “Factor substitution and factor augmenting technical: progress in the US: a normalized supply-side 
system approach” by R. Klump, P. McAdam and A. Willman, June 2004.
368 “Capital quality improvement and the sources of growth in the euro area” by P. Sakellaris 
and F. W. Vijselaar, June 2004.
369 “Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market” by K. Bernoth, J. von Hagen
and L. Schuknecht, June 2004.
370 “Inflation persistence during periods of structural change: an assessment using Greek data” 
by G. Hondroyiannis and S. Lazaretou, June 2004.
371 “Inflation persistence: facts or artefacts?” by C. R. Marques, June 2004. 
372 “The operational target of monetary policy and the rise and fall of reserve position doctrine” 
by U. Bindseil, June 2004. 
 and M. Fratzscher, May 2004.46
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 381
August 2004
373 “Technology shocks and robust sign restrictions in a euro area SVAR” by G. Peersman and 
R. Straub, July 2004. 
374 “To aggregate or not to aggregate? Euro area inflation forecasting” by N. Benalal,
J. L. Diaz del Hoyo, B. Landau, M. Roma and F. Skudelny, July 2004.
375   “Guess what: it’s the settlements!”  by T. V. Koeppl and C. Monnet, July 2004.
376 “Raising rival’s costs in the securities settlement industry” by C. Holthausen and
J. Tapking, July 2004.
377 “Optimal monetary policy under commitment with a zero bound on nominal interest rates”
by K. Adam and R. M. Billi, July 2004. 
378  “Liquidity, information, and the overnight rate” by C. Ewerhart, N. Cassola, S. Ejerskov 
and N. Valla, July 2004.
379
by K. Adam and R. M. Billi, August 2004.
B. Annicchiarico and N. Giammarioli, August 2004.
rate returns?” by O. Castrén, July 2004.
”
“Do financial market variables show (symmetric) indicator properties relative to exchange
380  “Optimal monetary policy under discretion with a zero bound on nominal interest rates
” 381   “Fiscal rules and sustainability of public finances in an endogenous growth model   by